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PSM in Italy: Troubled RAI in a troubled country 
Introduction 
In many ways, public service broadcasting in Italy can be considered as a success-
story. RAI, the country’s public service broadcasting organisation established after 
the end of World War II and operating as a state monopoly until the mid-1970, 
continues to this day to occupy a central place in the national media landscape. In 
2016 its three ‘legacy’ television channels (RAI1, RAI2, and RAI3) commanded 30% of 
all television viewing, in spite of growing commercial competition over the years. 
RAI’s suite of specialised channels (including news, children’s, cultural and sports 
channels) added a further 7%, bringing RAI’s total viewing share to 37%. No other 
European public service broadcasting organisation commanded as high a share of 
the national television viewing as RAI. Mediaset, RAI’s main commercial rival, trailed 
behind with a share of 32%. While television consumption has been (slowly) 
decreasing in recent years, as the time spent by people online keeps growing, 
television remains by far the most popular medium in Italy. It was estimated that 
Italians watched over 4 hours of television on the average day in 2016 (Ofcom 2017). 
Television’s reach is unmatched, and it remains especially high among the older 
generations (which make up a significant proportion of an aging country). RAI is also 
the biggest player in the radio sector, where it accounts for around a quarter of total 
industry revenue (Agcom 2017). Its radio services are widely praised for their high-
quality and public service orientation. As the country’s ‘main cultural institution’, RAI 
makes a major contribution in supporting the national audioviosual industry. In its 
more recent annual report, RAI claimed that in 2016 its overall investments in local 
TV drama and comedy had represented over 70% of total investments in the sector 
(RAI 2017: 7). RAI had produced the 20 most popular TV fictional programmes shown 
in that year. Last but not least, RAI remains the country’s largest journalistic 
organisation, employing nearly 2,000 journalists, a number four times as high the 
number of journalists working for Mediaset and twice the number of journalists at 
the country’s largest newspaper publisher, Gruppo Editoriale L’Espresso. RAI’s 
extensive and costly network of regional newsrooms, with a workforce of around 
700 journalists, plays a fundamental role in ensuring coverage of local events (all the 
more so at a time when local news outlets, both print and broadcast, are facing 
existential challenges). 
 
And yet, these contributions notwithstanding, RAI is often portrayed as a mammoth 
organisation falling prey to political patronage, weakened by both commercial and 
political pressures, and ultimately failing to fulfil its public service remit in key areas 
such as the provision of distinctive and innovative television programmes across all 
genres (D’Arma, 2015). Widely perceived as a highly politicised organisation and 
criticised for its excesses of commercialism in its entertainment-oriented fare, RAI 
has historically enjoyed a low level of support among the general public 
(notwithstanding the high share of viewing that, as seen, its main channels still 
command). 
 
These perceived failings of RAI as a public service institution have long made the 
political case for intervening in its organisation, funding and system of governance a 
compelling and seemingly pressing one. In post-1994 Berlusconi’s Italia, ‘reforming 
RAI’ was high in the media policy agenda (Hibberd, 2004; Hanretty, 2009; D’Arma, 
2009). And yet, despite repeated attempts at reforms and persisting calls for 
privatisation across the political spectrum, the key pillars of RAI’s institutional design 
were not altered during the ventennio Berlusconiano (as the twenty-year period 
from 1994-2013 dominated politically by Silvio Berlusconi is often referred to). 
Throughout this time, RAI continued to operate as a state-owned company funded 
by the licence fee (an hypothecated tax levied on all television households) 
supplemented by proceeds from the sale of advertising. For the worse or for the 
better, then, during this period a comprehensive reform of RAI in Italy remained an 
elusive target, attesting to the limited capacity for regulatory change in Italy in areas 
like public service broadcasting where entrenched political interests are at stake. 
 
The main aim of this chapter is to provide an account of the most significant 
developments concerning public service broadcasting in Italy after 2013, a period 
during which the country continued to experience a major economic downturn as 
well as undergoing significant political change. The latter included the growth of 
populist and anti-establishment political actors, exploiting popular discontent with 
mainstream parties, seen as corrupted and incapable to fix the country’s economic 
problems (see Tarchi, 2015). Most notably this period saw the rise of the Five Stars 
Movement, a protest movement grown out of a blog run since 2005 by comedian 
and activist Beppe Grillo. The Five Stars Movement established itself as Italy’s 
second-biggest political party in the national elections of 2013 and has remained at 
the forefront of the Italian political scene ever since then. The other main political 
novelty of these years was the rise of Matteo Renzi, from the centre-left Democratic 
Party. At 39 years of age, Renzi became in February 2014 Italy’s youngest ever Prime 
Minister, adopting a populist and highly personalised (and divisive) style of 
leadership (an absolute novelty for his political camp). Renzi resigned in late 2016 
after losing a major constitutional referendum, albeit remaining at the helm of his 
party.  
 
As it will be discussed in this chapter, under the reform-driven government of 
Matteo Renzi (2014-2016), both RAI’s funding model and its system of governance 
underwent major changes, although neither of these interventions were seen as 
adequate in providing a solution to the underlying problems they were supposedly 
meant to fix, namely insulating RAI from party political pressure and putting it on a 
more solid financial footing. More generally, as it will be discussed in the last two 
sections of the chapter, during the period under examination political factors have 
continued to constrain RAI’s ability to implement much-needed internal 
reorganisations (notably, of its news operations) and take long-term strategic 
decisions enabling RAI to face up to the digital challenge. Before turning to a 
consideration of these developments, the next section briefly looks at the impact 
that the economic crisis has had on the Italian media sector generally and on RAI in 
particular.  
 
A shrinking media market 
The effects of the global financial crisis of 2008 began to be felt on the Italian media 
system starting from 2010, leading to a shrinking of the sector in the years since. Like 
all the other ‘legacy’ players, RAI too, given its reliance on advertising revenues, has 
been hit hard by the economic downturn, whose effects have been compounded by 
the shift of financial resources away from traditional media and towards the Internet 
(albeit this shift has been less pronounced in Italy than elsewhere). According to 
figures provided by the Italian communications regulator (Agcom, 2016), the 
commercial revenues of the entire national media sector (both from the sale of 
advertising and direct consumer payment) fell by 17% from 2010 to 2015, down to 
€14.0 billion from €16.8 million. Advertising revenues in particular, after having 
grown steadily until 2009, fell by 22%, or nearly a quarter, between 2010 and 2015 
(from €8.8 to €6.9 billion) (see Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1. Media industry revenues in Italy, 2010 vs. 2015 (in million €) 
 
Source: AGCOM 2016 
Notes: Include commercial revenues in the television, radio, newspaper, magazine and Internet 
sectors. 
 
Among traditional media, the TV sector withstood the crisis better than newspapers 
during this period, but its revenues also decreased steadily until 2016. In 2106, for 
the first time in several years, there was a reversal of the downward trend, even 
though industry revenues remained below their 2010 levels (see Figure 2).  
 


















Source: Author’s elaboration on AGCOM 2016 and 2017 
 
 
As shown in Table 1 below, between 2010 and 2016 the TV sector dropped by 7% in 
overall industry revenue (comprising revenues from advertising, pay-TV and public 
funding) – down to €8.4 billion in 2016 from €9.0 billion in 2010. Advertising revenue 
declined more sharply than revenue from pay-TV, but remained the largest revenue 
stream, accounting in 2016 for 41% of total television revenue. 
 
Table 1: TV industry revenues by type, 2010-2016 (in million €) 







Advertising 4,282 4,221 3,621 3,266 3,220 3,249 3,453 -19.7 41.3 
Pay TV 3,006 3,051 2,990 2,984 3,023 2,952 3,018 -0.4 36.1 
Public funding 1,736 1,732 1,776 1,774 1,600 1,629 1,889 +8.8 22.6 
Total  9,025 9,004 8,388 8,024 7,844 7,830 8,360 -6.8 100 
Source: Author’s elaboration on AGCOM 2016 and 2017 
 
Public funding, the near totality of which is income derived from licence fee 
payments in favour of RAI, accounted for 22% of total industry revenue in 2016 (see 
Table 1 above). As it will be discussed in the next section, the noticeable increase 
recorded in 2016 (from €1,629 million in 2015 to €1,889 million), after years of 
stagnation, was due to a change in the method for collecting the licence fee (now 
linked to the electricity bill), leading to a drastic reduction in the rate of licence fee 
evasion (from over 25% to just 5%). In parallel to linking the licence fee to the 
electricity bill, the government also took the decision to reduce the per-household 
fee from €113.5 in 2015 to €90 in 2017. At the time this was written, RAI’s 2017 
financial results had not yet been released, but it was expected that the drastic 
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extra income deriving from reduced evasion and thus that RAI’s licence fee revenues 
for 2017 would return to their pre-2016 levels. 
 
Advertising, RAI’s other main source of revenue, almost halved in a 10-year period: 
from €1,137 million in 2007 to €698 million in 2016 (see Figure 3 below). Advertising 
revenues now accounts for only 25% of RAI’s total revenue (down from 40% ten 
years ago). However, RAI still depends on this source of revenue to cover its running 
costs. Thus, commercial considerations continue to have a significant bearing on 
RAI’s programming decisions. As it will be discussed in the next section, by increasing 
commercial pressure, reliance on advertising is considered to be the root cause of 
the historic charge levelled against RAI to chase audience ratings at the neglect of its 
public service obligations. 
 
Figure 3: RAI’s revenue breakdown (2007-2016) 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration on RAI annual reports 
Note: The licence fee figures here do not match with the figures on ‘public funding’ reported in Figure 


































licence fee income that according to Agcom’s estimates is allocated to finance RAI’s radio services 
(while they include public subsidies in favour of local television channels).  
 
The dramatic fall in RAI’s advertising revenue in the last 10 years reflects the general 
trend in the national advertising market. However, RAI’s main channels have also 
lost commercial appeal relative to other channels. Though remaining among the 
most watched channels, they have lost viewers in recent years, especially among 
younger people. Advertisers have shifted part of their budgets online or on the 
plethora of TV channels available on digital terrestrial satellite platforms. In response 
to this challenging market environment, RAI has adopted an aggressive policy of 
discounts, which has angered commercial broadcasters. Finally, it is important to 
note how the vast majority of RAI’s advertising revenues are still accounted for by its 
three legacy channels, and in particular by RAI1, RAI’s flagship channel. By contrast, 
RAI’s digital channels and its online activities still contribute very little to RAI’s 
commercial income. In 2016, RAI made a mere €8.5 million in online advertising 
revenue (or about 1% of RAI’s total adverting revenues!), reflecting its 
underwhelming performance online (more on which below) 
 
 
Reforming RAI under Renzi’s government (2014-2016) 
As mentioned in the introduction of this chapter, reforming RAI was one of the many 
items in the reformist agenda pursued by Matteo Renzi’s centre-left government 
(2014-2016). As it will be discussed in this section, both the system for collecting 
RAI’s licence fee and its governance underwent major changes during 2015, more 
than 10 years after the last reform under the Berlusconi government. Before 
recounting Renzi’s recent initiatives, however, it is important to see this latest 
attempt at reforming RAI in a historical perspective. 
 
A brief history of post-1994 reform attempts 
 
As its Southern European counterparts, RAI has long faced criticism for its bias 
towards the government of the day and for chasing ratings rather than quality in its 
programming (e.g., Mazzoleni and Vigevani, 2005; Padovani and Tracey, 2003). 
These two departures from the normative ideals of public service broadcasting 
(political independence and non-commercialism) have different origins and 
explanations. 
 
In the comparative literature, RAI is often taken as a paradigmatic case of a highly 
(party) politicised public service broadcaster (see, e.g., Blumler 1992; Humphreys 
1996; Hanretty 2009). Political interference in the management of RAI has arguably 
been a constant feature of RAI’s over sixty-year-long history, although the forms in 
which this phenomenon has manifested itself have changed considerably over time – 
from what has been described as ‘a lengthy post-war period of majoritarianism, one-
party dominance’ to ‘a state of multi-party politicisation lasting from the late 1970s 
through the 1980s’ (Humphreys 1996, 153–54); and from a period of more 
majoritarian-style dominance in post-1994 Italy, in parallel with the shift towards a 
more competitive political system in the early 1990s, to the return to more party 
politicised boards in accordance to the rules of proportional representation after a 
further legislative change of RAI’s governance in 2004 (see below). Scholars have 
argued that RAI’s deficit of political independence throughout its history is deeply 
rooted in the country’s enduring political culture, and in particular in a weak 
tradition of journalistic professionalism and autonomy (see, e.g., Mancini 2009). 
Politicians have always regarded news media, and public broadcasting in particular, 
as a central site for the exercise of political power and journalists have been all too 
prone to political power. 
 
RAI’s commercialism, on the other hand, has been explained on account of RAI’s 
reliance on income from advertising. More specifically, it is seen as an enduring 
legacy of the ‘savage deregulation’ of the 1980s when RAI was abruptly forced to 
enter into fierce competition for audience and adverting revenue with the new 
private channels, which were left completely unregulated (see, e.g., Richeri, 1990). 
RAI’s programming strategies were deeply transformed during those years. A 
commercial logic, so the argument goes, became increasingly pervasive within the 
organisation and weakened RAI’s public service ethos. 
 
In the early 1990s, thus, RAI provided one of the most striking examples in Western 
Europe of a public service broadcaster struggling amid old political pressures (arising 
from a deeply ingrained culture of party-political interference over all state-owned 
bodies and weak journalistic autonomy) and new market imperatives (in the context 
of fierce competition with the expanding private sector). RAI’s vulnerability to both 
political and commercial pressure meant that calls for its reform and even for its 
privatisation were recurring during this period. And yet, the highly politicised nature 
of the issue explains why until Matteo Renzi came to power in 2014 (that is, during a 
twenty-year period) the only regulatory change (whose impact was limited in scope) 
was the so-called Gasparri Law of 2004 (from the name of the proponent minister of 
the then Berlusconi government). The Gasparri Law established new rules for 
appointing RAI’s board (Consiglio di Amminstrazione). Its members were increased 
from five to nine and power of appointment, which from 1993 had rested upon the 
Speakers of the two Houses of Parliament, the two most senior institutional figures 
after the President of the Republic, and thus ‘theoretically above party politics’ 
(Hibberd 2001, 242), was handed back to a highly politicised parliamentary 
committee overseeing RAI, as it had been the case from the mid-1970s until 1993. 
The Gasparri law also gave the government, RAI’s main shareholder, power over the 
appointment of two members, including the chairman. By transferring power of 
appointment to Parliament and (controversially) government, the Gasparri law 
deviated strikingly from the set of measures that legal experts concurred would be 
needed to endow RAI with greater legal protection against political interference. 
These legal prescriptions included the involvement of actors outside ‘institutional’ 
politics in the appointment of the members of the RAI board (e.g., representatives of 
civil society, RAI’s workforce, and academia) and restrictions on the possibility to 
serve as board member for those who have held elected political posts.  
 
Besides introducing new appointment procedure for RAI’s board, the Gasparri Law, 
even more controversially, provided for a badly-conceived, much-criticised, but 
eventually never-implemented plan to list RAI on the stock exchange – a plan that 
ultimately envisaged RAI’s full privatisation. The stated objective was to insulate RAI 
from party-political interference. No consideration, however, was given to how to 
reconcile the public service remit with shareholders’ profit motive. 
 
Shortly after returning to power in 2006, the centre-left government submitted a bill 
to Parliament taking on board several of the measures recommended by legal 
experts, including: the establishment of a Fondazione (Trust) to which RAI’s shares 
would be transferred (to create a buffer between RAI and the government - RAI is a 
private-law limited company whose shares are held by the government); the 
extension of the term length for board members, stricter incompatibility rules, and 
the involvement of civil society in the appointments (Spada 2007; Padovani 2010). 
However, the bill did not make its way through Parliament before the fall of the 
executive in 2008, mid-way through the legislature, due to conflicts within the 
centre-left coalition. 
 
RAI’s new governance: ‘Keep the political parties out of RAI’? 
 
From 2008 until 2014, in the context of the economic crisis plaguing the country and 
amidst political uncertainty, the reform of RAI went pretty much off the radar. So 
much so that when in 2012 the three-year service contract between RAI and the 
Italian government expired its renewal was delayed in the general indifference. 
Upon forming its cabinet in early 2014, Matteo Renzi, the young and reform-driven 
leader of centre-left Democratic Party, however, pledged to make RAI more 
competitive in the marketplace and less vulnerable to political interference, with the 
slogan ‘fuori i partiti dalla RAI’ (‘keep the political parties out of RAI’). The reform of 
RAI was thus, once again, put back on the political agenda.  
 
Renzi’s push to reform RAI boiled down initially to a change to the (much-criticised) 
procedures for appointing the RAI board established by the Gasparri law in 2004. A 
government bill submitted in the spring of 2015 was sealed into the statute book in 
December 2015. The new rules reduced the number of board members from nine to 
five and also established that RAI’s director-general (‘managing director’ under the 
new rules) would be appointed by government and be given much wider powers vis-
à-vis RAI’s board. The board would in future comprise of two members elected by 
each house of the Parliament; two members appointed by government; and a 
member chosen by RAI employees. These changes might have gone some way 
towards achieving one of Renzi’s two stated goals – that is, giving RAI a corporate 
makeover and make it a less bureaucratic organisation by strengthening the powers 
of the managing director. Commentators, however, agreed that the bill did not go 
far enough on its stated intention to severe the ties between RAI and politics. While 
it introduced incompatibility rules for those having served as high government 
officials, it provided controversially for the empowered figure of the managing 
director to be a government appointee. 
 
Recent changes to RAI’s funding system: ‘Everyone pays, everyone pays less’ 
 
The other regulatory initiative of the Renzi government was to link the RAI licence 
fee payment to the electricity bill starting from 2016, in a bid to reduce rampant 
evasion. At the time, it was estimated that more than one in four Italian TV 
households was not paying licence fee and RAI claimed that evasion was subtracting 
€600 million from its annual budget. The introduction of the new collection method 
proved to be very effective in the fight against evasion: between 2015 and 2016, the 
number of households that paid the licence fee went from 16.5 to 22 million (with 
the rate of evasion now estimated to be at just 5%). However, the positive impact on 
RAI’s income was diluted by the contextual decision of the Renzi government to 
drastically reduce the unit fee from  €113.5 to €100 in 2016 and then further down 
to €90 in 2017. Under the arrangements put in place by the government, the State 
would also keep a share of the extra income recovered from the evasion (33% in 
2016) and allocate it to local television channels and newspaper publishers. As seen 
in the previous section, despite the reduction of the fee to €100, RAI’s licence fee 
income grew significantly in 2016 (an increase of Euro 272 million or +16.6% 
compared to 2015). However, with the further reduction of the fee to €90 in 2017 
(and the share of the extra-income to be kept by the State to be raised to 50%), it 
was estimated that almost all the benefits of the introduction of the ‘fee in the 
electricity bill’ would be neutralised.  
 
To sum up, Renzi was driven by the commendable aim to fight evasion of the licence 
fee payment on grounds of fairness and equality. His decision, contextually to the 
introduction of the new method of collection, to drastically reduce the per-
household fee, under the slogan tutti pagano, tutti pagano di meno (‘everyone pays, 
everyone pays less’) was clearly a move designed to appease voters (the licence fee 
is often described as Italians’ most despised tax). Ultimately, though, this was a 
missed opportunity to create the enabling financial conditions for RAI to better fulfil 
its public service remit, by increasing its level of public funding and reducing its 
reliance on advertising revenue. At €90 per-household, the licence fee in Italy is by 
far the lowest among the larger Western European countries (it is less than half the 
amount paid by German households). This is a hard fact that goes more often than 
not unnoticed the national political debate on public service broadcasting. 
 
RAI and politics under Renzi  
It is fair to say that the rise of Renzi to the centre of the national political scene did 
not mark a clear break with old practices and patterns of political behaviour in 
relation to public service broadcasting. Upon coming to power, Renzi pledged that 
he would keep politics out of RAI, but his first initiative appeared to betray the 
stated intentions. In the run up to regional elections of June 2014, his new 
government took abruptly the decision to levy €150 million against RAI’s licence fee 
income for 2014 in order to help fund tax cuts for low-income earners. This was the 
latest in a series of historical instances of politicians meddling with RAI’s funding. 
Renzi was criticised for what was seen as a populist electoral move in a bid to endear 
him to the electorate. The decision sent a clear signal to RAI’s board members and 
top managers that RAI’s funding under the new Renzi cabinet would be far from 
secure. 
 
The extent to which political constraints continue to affect RAI’s ability to take major 
strategic decisions is perhaps best illustrated by the recent saga of foundered 
attempts at reorganising RAI’s newsrooms in order to reduce costs and enhance 
RAI’s online news operations. In early 2015, RAI’s then general-director Luigi 
Gubitosi won approval from the RAI board for a cost-saving plan to reduce the 
number of RAI’s newsrooms from 8 to 2, the longer-term goal being to create a 
single newsroom on the BBC model. The plan met with the strong opposition, both 
within and outside RAI. The main argument of its critics was that the effect of the 
reorganisation would be to undermine RAI’s tradition of (external) political pluralism 
[safeguarded, according to this argument by a multiplicity of differently politically-
connoted newsrooms]. With Gubitosi’s tenure coming close to an end, the plan was 
effectively shelved. Gubitosi’s successor, Antonio Campo Dall'Orto, a well-respected 
TV executive with significant experience in the private sector, sponsored by Renzi), 
also undertook to reorganise RAI’s news services and in particular to strengthen 
RAI’s digital news operation, understaffed (with a newsroom of only 15 journalists) 
and underperforming (ranked 30th among the most visited portals). The plan was to 
create a new web portal (to be named rai24.it) staffed with 88 journalists and run by 
one of RAI’s most well-known and trusted journalists, investigative reporter Milena 
Gabanelli. RAI’s board rejected the plan in May 2017, which prompted Dall’Orto’s 
immediate resignations followed by those of Gabanelli. Sources close to the 
Dall’Orto were quoted in Italian press as maintaining that the reasons for the 
dismissal of the plan by the board had been ‘all political’ and that RAI continued to 
be ‘hostage to politics’ – a version of facts denied by the Board members, but widely 
endorsed in the national press. According to journalistic accounts, the relationship 
between Renzi and Dall’Orto had become increasingly strained since the Dall’Orto’s 
appointment to director-general two years earlier as a result of a series of decisions 
taken by Dall’Orto that had not seen with favour by Renzi (see, e.g., Il Fatto 
Quotidiano 2017). RAI’s journalists union issued a very critical press release (Usigrai, 
2017a), calling it  ‘the final act by a general-director and a board of directors that are 
unsuitable for the role’ and calling for ‘an irresponsible management that puts its 
power conflicts over and above the good of RAI and public service’ to leave. 
 
With general elections scheduled to take place in March 2018, RAI was again at the 
centre of political rumours. Italy’s daily newspaper, La Repubblica (2018) reported in 
early 2018 that Renzi was adamant to include in the Democratic Party’s electoral 
manifesto a proposal to abolish the licence fee and replace it with funding from 
general taxation during a three-year transitional period, at the end of which RAI 
would then be required to rely entirely on advertising revenues (its advertising caps 
relaxed). The report stirred up a debate among politicians. Critical voices included 
leading exponents of Renzi’s Democratic Party. Others stigmatised it as a blatant 
electoral move and pure political gameship. And RAI’s journalists union issued 
another strongly disapproving statement (Usigrai, 2017b): ‘Timely as a Swiss clock, 
when the electoral campaign starts, there come attacks on RAI. It’s a script that has 
been repeated for years: we point out that in countries where the licence has been 
abolished, public service media has been greatly reduced, to the benefit of the 
private sector’.  
 
RAI and the digital challenge 
Similarly to its pubic and private counterparts, RAI faces serious challenges as it 
strives to maintain its relevance in the (expanding) online space. RAI’s weak 
performance online stands in stark contrast to the high viewing share that its main 
television channels and news bulletins still command. Perhaps the most telling figure 
is the one relating to RAI’s news website, which trails far behind its competitors. In 
January 2018, the rainews.it domain ranked only 33rd in the ranking of the most 
popular online news sites in January 2018 (Prima Comunicazione, 2018). Its unique 
visitors were a mere 111,111, a figure roughly ten times lower than those of the 
three top news sites, namely Repubblica and Corriere della Sera (Italy’s top selling 
newspapers) and TGCOM24 (Mediaset’s news website). As this was written, RAI’s 
general online domain (rai.it) did not even figure among the top-50 websites in Italy 
(according to statistics released by Alexa.com), unlike those of other domestic legacy 
players (both broadcasters and newspaper publishers). In her study of public service 
broadcasters’ internet policies, Benedetta Brevini (2010: 356) argues that in Italy 
‘RAI’s online expansion has been seriously compromised by scarce resources, 
management turnover and the lack of any long-term strategy’. At the time of her 
research, RAI NET, RAI’s division for Internet activities set up in the late 1990s, was 
allocated just 0.2 per cent of RAI’s annual budget, with priority then going to digital 
terrestrial television rather than online. Furthermore, RAI’s online offering was 
characterised for its string orientation towards entrainment, as opposed news.  
 
Two recent reports on PSM’s delivery of news online by the Reuters Institute for the 
Study of Journalism at the University of Oxford support Brevini’s earlier analysis (see 
Sehl et al 2016; 2018). The authors of the report identify a number of common 
challenges in the delivery of news online facing PSM organisations in the six 
countries covered in their study, including: the need to implement internal 
reorganisations to more effectively delivery news in an increasingly digital media 
environment; incorporating mobile delivery as smartphones become more and more 
central to how people access news; and using social media platforms as more and 
more news use is driven by referrals from various platforms like Facebook. RAI’s 
approach to online news delivery is described as highly fragmented and un-
coordinated, in contrast to the more centralized approach of other PSM 
organisations like the BBC in the UK and YLE in Finland. It was only in 2013 that 
rainews.it started as a unified news website with the aim of integrating content from 
across the organization and only in December 2015 that RAI established a new digital 
division to bring together the whole of RAI’s digital offering. As recounted in the 
previous section, however, the implementation of these recent projects has 




RAI continues to occupy a central place within the national media landscape. In the 
opening paragraphs of this chapter it was highlighted how, for all its failings, RAI 
makes a major contribution in several key areas of provision and it is by far the main 
investor in local films and television programmes. And yet, political and commercial 
pressures have historically weakened its performance as a public service media 
organisation. These pressures continue unabated. This chapter has reviewed recent 
changes to RAI’s governance and funding system under the Renzi government (2014-
2016). It situated this latest attempt at reforming RAI both historically and in relation 
to contemporary economic and political conditions (notably the rise in populist 
politics fuelled by the economic hardships of recent years). Compared with its 
predecessors, Renzi certainly demonstrated a more pro-active and decisive approach 
to the vexed question of public service broadcasting. Linking the licence fee to 
electricity bills was motivated by the commendable intention of fighting evasion and 
ensuring its near-universal payment – and on this count the initiative can surely be 
judged as a success. However, the drastic reduction in the unit fee, without a serious 
debate accompanying this major decision, means that an opportunity was lost to 
bring the level of RAI’s per-capita public funding more in line with those of RAI’s 
more generously funded counterparts in continental and Northern Europe – a 
condition many see as necessary for raising RAI’s public service profile. In the 
meantime, RAI’s governance changes disappointed those who took Renzi at face 
value when pledging to keep politics out of RAI. The events surrounding the rejection 
of Dall’Orto’s news plan by RAI’s Board is illustrative of how political factors continue 
to have a major bearing on RAI’s ability to adapt its organisational forms in order to 
meet the challenges that, like all its European counterparts, it is confronted with.  
 
For the time being, RAI’s position as the country’s pubic service media organisation 
appears to be secure. In 2017, RAI’s 10-year Convention with the State was renewed 
and, as this was written, a new service contract (2018-2022), stipulating in greater 
detail RAI’s public service obligations, was reaching the final stage of drafting after a 
lengthy renewal process. Extemporaneous proposals such as Renzi’s leaked plan to 
scrap the licence fee are unlikely to be implemented. Political analysts see them as 
part of the political game ahead of the forthcoming elections. They are indicative, 
however, of the fact that the political debate on public service media in Italy appears 
to be almost schizophrenic, and it is certainly poorly informed and lacking a long-
term vision. Beyond political rhetoric and aspirational but ultimately empty slogans 
on RAI being a ‘leading cultural industry’ and ‘a great engine of educational and 
cultural identity’, the bare reality is that there is little genuine concern among 
politicians over the future of public service media in the country and no political 
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